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Summary:
This paper analyses the indicence of the residential property tax
in an economy with tv70 communities. Mobility is assumed for
workers so that their utility levels are equal in the two communities
in equilibrium. The property tax is modelled as an ad valorem tax
on housing services.
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THE INCIDENCE OF THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX IN A
SYSTEM OF COMMUNITIES: A NEW APPROACH
by
Jan K. Brueckner
In Mieskowski^s well-known 1972 paper, modern tax incidence theory,
as enunciated by Harberger (1962), was first used to analyse the incidence
of the property tax. The paper's unconventional conclusions have now be-
come accepted doctrine, embodying what has been referred to as the "new
view" of the property tax. The main idea of the new view is that an
increase in the property tax rate in a community has two effects: first,
it depresses the rate of return on capital in the economy as a whole;
second, it increases the price of capital in the given, community relative
to its price elsewhere. VJhile Mieskowski's argument was largely informal,
a precise analysis of these two effects was presented by Courant (1977)
.
In spite of the significant improvement in our understanding of the
effects of the property tax which the new view has made possible, the
public finance literature still lacks an explicit general equilibrium
treatment of the tax in a realistic model of the economy, a fact which
has been noted by several writers. The present paper begins the task
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of filling this void. In addition to developing a complete model of the
economy, the paper makes a number of alterations to the new view approach.
First, instead of modelling the property tax as a tax on shiftable struc-
ture and non-structure capital, it is realistically assumed that the tax
is levied on the value of structural services, which are produced with
inputs of land and capital. In the residential case, this means the
property tax is taken to be an ad valorem tax on housing services. It is
well known that an ad valorem tax on the output from a constant returns
production process is indistinguishable in comparative static analysis
from an ad valorem tax applied at equal rates to the inputs, provided
that the comparative static derivatives are evaluated at zero tax rates.
Therefore, the residential property tax analyzed in this paper also may
be viewed as an ad valorem tax on the land and capital used as inputs in
the production of housing. The second alteration to the new view approach
is that labor is assumed to be mobile across communities, so that in
equilibrium the utility level of workers is the same in each community.
The treatment of labor mobility in the new view analysis is unclear, but
the assumption of complete mobility is certainly appropriate in any long
run model.
The particular model analysed in this paper was chosen after analysis
of a number of more attractive models proved inconclusive. The economy
represented by the model has two communities occupying equal fixed land
areas £ (they can be thought of as islands), with the land in each com-
munity owned by immobile resident landowners. Workers cultivate part
of each community's land to produce an exportable commodity called "wood"
with constant returns to scale. The allocation between communities of
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the 2L workers in the economy is endogenous. Wood is consumed directly
by workers and landowners, but it is also combined with a community's
remaining land to produce housing with a constant returns technology.
While the utility levels of the mobile workers must be equal in the two
communities, landowners' immobility means their utility levels may differ
across communities in equilibrium. Comparative static analysis is used
to find the effects in the model of an increase in the property tax rate
in one or both communities.
A further divergence from the new view approach shoxold be clear
from the description of the model: since the capital used in housing
production is an intermediate good, the effect of the property tax on
the owners of capital, an important concern of the new view analysts,
is non-existent in the model. Although this divergence from the new
view approach was necessitated by the intractability of realistic models
with an exogenous stock of capital, there are reasons for preferring
our model in any case. In the real world, capital is not an exogenous
endowment of a certain group in the economy, as the new view implicitly
requires; it is an intermediate good produced using basic factors such
as land and labor. Thus, although our model departs from the new view
tradition, it can be argued that its treatment of capital is appropriate
for a general equilibrium analysis.
'''' It will help put our model in perspective if the structure of a
few of the intractable models which conform more closely to the new
view approach is sketched. One model has an exogenous stock of export-
able capital in each community owned by immobile individuals. Struc-
tures are produced by combining capital ^Tlth each community's entire
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land area. Some structuies are consumed directly while the remainder
are combined with the coEmunity's labor force to produce an exportable
consumer good. Since stiuctures are both a final and an intermediate
good, the property tax in this model is both a business and a residen-
tial tax. In another moclel, capital is combined with a portion of each
community's land to produce housing while the remaining land is com-
bined with the labor forc;e to produce an exportable consumer good.
As in the model analysed below, the property tax here is solely a resi-
dential tax.
Although results frcm these models would have told us something
about the validity of th«: new view in a complete model of the economy,
the models' intractability required a retreat to our more manageable
framework. In spite of i.ts shortcomings, this framework is more
realistic than those pre\'iously used to analyse the incidence of the
property tax. Section II of the paper contains analysis of the model
for the general case, where results are incomplete, *Aile Section III
presents a complete analysis using Cobb-Douglas utility and production
functions. Section IV ccntains conclusions.
II.
The variables in th€i model are defined as follows. The wages, land
rents, and (gross of tax) housing prices in the two communities are respec-
tively w., r., p., i=l,2. The price of wood is set equal to unity. The
labor forces in the commtjiitles are L. and the outputs of housing are
H
,
, 1=1,2. The land areas used in wood production and housing production
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respectively are I. and £ , i=l,2. The wood inputs to housing production
H
are K , i=l,2, and the property tax rates in the communities are t.,
i=l,2.
The economy starts in equilibrium with t, = t„ = 0, and the effect
of an increase in x^ holdiiig t„ fixed is analysed. After results for this
change are derived, the case where both tax rates increase is considered.
Since the land areas of the communities are equal, the initial equilibrium
is sjTmnetric, with identical values for each of the variables in both
communities. As in the standard Harberger approach, the equilibrium system
was totally differentiated, with all changes expressed in relative terms.
The resulting labor force constraint and the land constra4.nts in each com^
munity may be written
dL^ + dL^ = (1)
vv. £^d£^* + aW* = i=l,2, . (2)
1 i
"
' "
'
'
' "' yrfc V k'
where * indicates natural logarithm (that is, dl. = dl.i'l., and so on).o > 'il
Note that (1) and (2) incorporate the symmetry assumption because
L^ = L2 = L, r^ = ^2 " °^' ^^^ ^1 '^ ^2 " ^'
Housing production is characterized for i=l,2 by the conditions
dK. - dJl. = a dr. (3)
1 i 1
* H* H*
'^i = V'4 ^ ^.'^'^i ^^>
v:,-: - dp* = dx^ + f^dr*
,
(5)
H
where a is the elasticity of substitution between wood and land in hous-
ing production and f and f are the factor shares of wood and land in
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housing. Each of these quantities is the same in both communities because
of the symmetry of the initial equilibrium. Note that (3) embodies the
assumption that wood is numeraire and that (3) comes from differentiating
H H
the zero profit identity P^Cl -
"^-t^^i
- K - r.£ H and setting x, = 0.
Similar conditions for the wood sector are, for i=l,2,
dL^ - dl^ = a'^idx^ - dw^) (6) -if/wia
gj^dw* + gj^dr* = 0, (7)
where o is the elasticity of substitution between labor iand land in wood
production and g^ and g. are the factor shares. The RHS of (7) is zero
because wood is numeraire. A wood-sector equation such as (4) is unneces-
sary because the changes in wood outputs need not be solved for in the
model.
The eqiial utility requirement for workers means V(w, ,p,) = V(w2,P2)>
where V is the indirect utility function for workers, who all have the same
tastes. Since 3V/5w = X, where X is the marginal utility of income, and
3V/Sp = -Xq, where q is individual housing consumption by workers, differ-
entiating the above equation yields X(dw, - qdp, ) = A(dw„ - qdp-) . Note
that housing consumption and the marginal utility of income are the same
in both communities by symmetry. Dividing by X and assuming that all
prices are initially equal to one by choice of units yields
4f "ic ^ "k
dw - qdp = dw- - qdp„ (8)
It is important to note that the equal utility condition implicitly ignores
benefits from public expenditure; public goods are not among the arguments
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of the indirect utility function. This omission follows the Harberger
tradition, in which benefits from government spending are never considered.
The approach is meant to isolate the pure effects of the tax without in-
troducing issues related to the valuation of public goods.
In the standard Harberger framework, it is assumed that the govern-
ment spends tax revenue so as to cancel the income effect of any tax change.
The validity of this artifice has been discussed by McClure (1975) and
Ballentine and Eris (1975) . In this paper, however, the demand-shifting
effects of the property tax change are incorporated into the analysis. It
was felt that in a model where migration of labor can alter the populations
of the taxing jurisdictions, the effects of demand changes could not be
safely assxmed away. To permit demand effects to be included, it was as-
sumed that landowners have the same tastes as workers, and tb-at these tastes
generate demand functions which are homogeneous of degree one in income.
Furthermore, in keeping with the Harberger tradition, it was assumed that
the governments spend their tax revenues in exactly the way they would
if they were consumers. These assumptions mean that the demand for housing
in each community is given by D(p., w,L. -r r.Jl + p.x H.), where D
is the demand function. Since prices are initially equal to one, the
housing demand condition may be written as
HdH^ = edp^ + m[L(dw^ + dL^) + idv^ + dt^H] i=l,2, (9)
where e = 3D/9p and m is the marginal propensity to consume, which are
identical across communities by symmetry. H is the housing output in each
community in the initial equilibrium.
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The system (1) - (9) contains sixteen equations to solve for the six-
* A ft A 5^- K* H* H*
teen unknowns dw. , dp., dr., dL., dH., d£. , d£, , and dK. , i=l,2. The
changes in wood production in each comiminity resulting from changes in L.
I'
and i. are given by two equations analogous to (4) . The wood demand con-
dition, which states that the change in total wood consumption in the two
communities equals the change in total wood production, is automatically
satisfied by Walras' law.
-.i^ H*
-sir"-To solve the system, dH., dp , d£. , dK. , and dw are eliminated
X X X X X
using (4), (5), (2), (3), and (7) respectively. Then dL, is eliminated
H* "
using (6), and the resulting four-equation system in dJl. and dr. is
solved with dT„ = 0. The solution yields
^^1
e + mH q
9'^ n K)S„L ,, g„ £.
(10)
• 2(f-,a"H - £f
„
'- mi + —^ + a%a + Zk) _S) 2(qf„ + '-^
From the Slutsky equation, £ = £ - mH, v/here 2 is the negative substitution
term, and therefore the numerator of the first expression in (10) is nega-
tive and equal to 2. Now g„/&f = S. /L because prices are unity, and sim-
rr
ilarly f. - % /H. Thus the three middle terms in the denominator of the
P K H
first expression in (10) are equal to ~el"lE - ml + m£ = -£ (mrt-e/H) =
tj
-I £/H > 0, Since the remaining terms in the denominator are positive,
the entire denominator is positive and whole expression is negative.
Since the second expression in (10) is also negative, we have SrwSi:. < 0,
Equation (7) immediately itD.plies cw../8t > 0.
Since the demand function is homogeneous of degree one in income, the
housing consumption of v/orkers, q, is given by w times the ratio of H to
_9.
aggregate income. Since w is unity and aggregate Income is L+i in the in-
itial equilibriian, this means q = H/(L+£). Using this result, the second
term in (10) becomes (~il + j^)) . Using (5), dp^/dt^^ = 1 + f^dr^/dxj^,
and factoring out 1/2 times the positive product of the denominators in
(10) gives dp^/dx, the same sign as
2| (1 + ^) [A^ -^-^ 0^(1 + f"^ \3
» [2Jl(l + f-) - Si^]la\l + ~) — + ^]
-—• [A(i +~) - rj (11)
*
Thus, dpwdx^ > since (11) is clearly positive. In summary, starting -
from an equilibrium where no property taxes are levied, an increase in
the property tax rate in community one depresses land rent but increases
the wage and the housing price in that community. All the remaining com-
parative static derivatives cannot be signed unambiguously, although it
it A
may be shown that sgn(dL^/dx.) = -sgn(dr„/dx- ) ; labor flows toward (away
from) community one when the land rent in community two decreases (in-
creases) . It is clear that the landowners' utility level falls in com-
3
munity one since land rent falls while the housing price increases. It
may be shown that the utility change for workers is ambiguous.
In order to understand the effects of the property tax rate change .
in community one, it will be helpful to consider the effects of an equal
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tax change in both communities. When both tax rates increase by equal
amounts so that dx-^ = dx^ = dx, complete results are easily obtained in
the general case. Since the symmetry of the initial equilibrium is pre-
served, it follows that 3L^/3t = 9L„/3x = 0. Using this fact, it is
*
,
easily shown that Br./Sx, i=l,2, is equal to 2 times the first expression
""
*
'^
in (10), a negative quantity. This immediately yields 8w,/3x > 0, and
also gives SJl. /9x < 0, 3K^ /Sx < 0, which imply 8H /3x < 0, i=l,2. Also,
K*
the output of wood increases in each conmiunity since 3£, /3x > and
it i;
3L,/3x = 0, i=l,2. Finally, it may be shown that 3p./3x > 0, i=l,2. Of
x i
course, each derivative has the same value in both communities. Thus,
when both property tax rates increase, land rents fall and wages and
housing prices rise in both coimnunities. Since, land is withdrawn from
housing production, wood production in each community increases. Since
the wood input to housing falls, housing output decreases and the amount
of wood directly consumed increases. Since land rents fall and housing
prices increase, the utility level of landowners falls, although the util-
ity change for workers is ambiguous, ""'
It should be noted that the reallocation of land and the lack of
change in the labor force in each community make the effect of the tax
change on w. and r intuitively transparent. Since land flows from
the housing sector to the wood sector, which employs the fixed labor force,
it follows that the marginal product of labor and the wage increase, while
the marginal product of land in the wood sector, and thus the land rent in
both sectors, decreases. This argianent cannot be made when only community
one's tax rate increases. In that case, the change in land allocation
between the sectors and the change in the labor force are ambiguous.
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III.
In order to derive complete results for case where community one alone
increases its tax rate, this section presents an example using specific
functional forms. It is assumed that the wood and housing production func-
tions are (L^)^(J!.J)'''"^ and (kJ)°'C«,J)
"'"'*
respectively, where < a, g < 1,
Y 6
and that the utility function is h k , where h and k are housing and vjood
consumption respectively. Letting 6 = y/(Y"*"<5)» the equilibrium conditions
analogous to (1) - (9) are, for i=l,2.
L. + L^ = 2L (12)
i^ + Si^ = a (13)
H^ = (kJ)°'(L^)^~" (14)
(1_, .)p.H. „ kJ - r.ilj = (15)
i = 1=^ ^1 ^">
1
K^ = (L^)^£^)^"^ (17)
K^ - w.L. - r.£^ = (18)
i 1 1 1 1
^K - 1-a w.
(19)
^l^l'^ =
^2^2*^ ^2°^
H^ = — (w.L. + r.£ + T.p.H.) (2i>
i p 1 1 1 11 1
-12-
Equations (20) and (21) contain the Cobb-Douglas indirect utility and de-
mand functions respectively, and K. in (17) denotes wood output in comr-
munity i. Solving the system (12) - (21) yields ^''
r^ = B(C^ -f C^(.^)-^^''h-^
.^
(22)
^2 = S(C^(^)®/^^ + Cp-^ (23)
Pi = Vi'" ^2^>
w. = Gr/^-1^/^ (25)
i^ = (1-C.)£ (26)
'i "" x'
L3_ = FC^(C^ ^ C2(^) ^'-^)
,
(27)
4
where
A^ = a~"(l-a)~^-^'"^(l-T^)~-'- (28)
(i-e)(i-eT )
^i = ^-^^^9(l-a)(l-xj^ ' (29)
t = e(a-l) + (B-l)/3, and B. F, and G are constants.
While all the conclusions of Section II may be verified by direct cal-
culation, it turns out that 3r /3t < and 3w^/3t > hold regardless of
the initial values of x and r . Since 3C„/3t = and it may be shown that
3C, /3t- > 0, 3Jt,/3T, < and 3£^/3t, = from (26). Further calculation shows
X • 1 . -1. 1 Z 1
that when t = i = 0, 3r„/3T > 0, which implies 3p /3t > and 3w /3t <
using (24) and (25), and the same calculation establishes 3L /3t < 0.
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H
Since labor flows to community two and ii- is constant, 3K„/3t > 0. Also,
H H
the constancy of i„ and the increase in r„ mean 3K„/3t- > from (15),
H V
which Implies '3H2/3t^ > 0. Furthennorej since 3r^/9T^ < 0, K./lS must
fall from (16). But since dl^/St^ < 0, this requires 3K^/ St j_ < 0, which
K
implies 31L/3t < 0. Finally, since 3Li,/3t^ < and dlj^x > 0, it turns
out that the sign of 3IC./St^, is ambiguous. Nov; since the wage falls and
the housing price rises in community twoj the utility level of workers
there and in community one falls. The utility level of landowners in com-
munity one falls, while their utility level in community txjo, which from
—6 1—9 ^1—ct^
the indirect utility function and (24) is proportional to A„ r2
,
rises since Sr^/Sx. > 0,
In summary, when x. = t_ = 0, an increase in the property tax rate
in community one has the following effects: Labor flows from community
one to community two; land is shifted from housing to wood production in
community one while land-use is unchanged in community two; housing and
wood production increase in community tv/o while housing production falls
in community one; the wage and housing price increase while land rent de-
creases in community one; the wage decreases while the housing price and
land rent increase in community 2; the utility level of workers and com-
munity-one landowners falls while the utility level of conmunity-two land-
owners increases. These conclusions are suianarized in Table 1. By con-
tinuity, the comparative static results for this exanple also apply when
T^ and T^ are "small" and equal.
K
It is easy to see that since L- falls and i. increases, the marginal
products of labor and land in wood production in community one respectively
rise and fall, causing the wage and land rent to rise and fall respectively,
-14-
II
Since £„ is constant, the labor inflow to community two increases the mar-
ginal product of land in wood production and depresses the marginal product
of labor, causing the wage and land rent to fall and rise respectively.
Recall that the general solution with identical tax increases in the
communities lacked an unambiguous conclusion about the utility change for
workers. The worker utility change for this case is easily derived in the
above example, however, when t = t = 0, and the result is that worker
utility falls when both tax rates increase. Recall that landowners are
also hurt in this case.
•
•-^'
' IV. ''--'' " . . ..:.: ^ ,. -
The unavoidably arbitrary nature of any detailed model of the economy
means that the results in this paper cannot be taken as definitive. Slight
changes in the representation of the economy could lead to quite different
conclusions about the effects of a property tax increase. Accordingly, the
contribution of this paper should be viewed as primarily methodological.
The most significant improvement over previous studies is our use of an
explicit general equilibrium model for the analysis. In addition, we im-
pose the appropriate long-run condition of equal utilities across communi-
ties for mobile workers, and realistically model the property tax as an .
ad valorem tax on housing services. Finally, the analysis incorporates
demand effects, which have generally been Ignored in tax incidence studies,
A goal for future research should be the development of other de- .
tailed models which further our understanding of the property tax:. The
attractiveness of the new view results should not make us believe that
there is nothing left to learn in this important area. '/... ' .
Prices
Inputs
Outputs
Utilities
Table 1
Effects of an Increase in Community One's
Property Tax Rate-Cobb-Douglas Example
Pi P2 «1 «2 ^1 ^2
+ + + -- +
h ^2 ^1 ^2 ^1 H \ ^2
-0 + 0- + - +
^1 "2 ^1 '^2
workers lando^raers in 1 landowners in 2
- - +
Footnotes
For readable summaries of the new view, see Aaron (1975) and McClure
(1975) and (1977).
2
See Courant and Break (1974).
wote that it was not necessary to specify the number of landowners
in each community or the distribution of land among them at any point in
the analysis.
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